291

Re: KrustnešuWač! Lielākoties Irāka&Afganistāna&Čečenija.

Šoreiz pa īstam.

Во имя Аллаха Милостивого Милосердного!

Пусть же сражаются на пути Аллаха те, которые покупают за ближайшую жизнь будущую! И если кто  сражается на пути Аллаха и будет убит или победит, Мы дадим ему великую награду.

Коран, сура 4 ан-НисаI, айат 74

2 марта около 5 утра крупные силы кафиров и муртадов блокировали село Экажево и начали осуществление в нем карательной операции. По последним данным, стали Шахидами (инша Аллах!) шесть мусульман, смело встретивших карателей лицом к лицу. Около пятнадцати местных жителей были похищены кафирами на глазах у своих родных и соседей, полностью разрушено несколько домов. Окруженные десятками вооруженных до зубов врагов Аллаха, несколько наших братьев долго и упорно оказывали сопротивление, причинив урон наступающему противнику, однако силы были слишком неравны, и они, инша Аллах, получили лучший удел, о котором мы можем только мечтать – праведную смерть в борьбе за Слово Аллаха. Всем искренним верующим следует делать ду’а за них и просить для них у Аллаха سبحانه و تعالى садов Фирдауса – высшей степени Рая. Также следует просить у Высочайшего и Милостивейшего освобождения для верующих, попавших в кафирские застенки, и исцеления раненым, а для сражающихся сейчас на этом великом пути муджахидов – облегчения трудностей и победы. И да укрепит Аллах سبحانه و تعالى дух и терпение всех мусульман, живущих под оккупацией кафиров, да облегчит Он их положение и да выведет из тягот кафирского господства!

Мы будем, инша Аллах, до окончания нашей бренной жизни помнить братьев, ушедших от нас навстречу лучшему уделу, и просить Аллаха سبحانه و تعالى, чтобы Он вновь соединил нас в Раю. Мы все принадлежим Аллаху سبحانه و تعالى, и к Нему возвращаемся, и наша разлука с любимыми братьями далеко не так долга, как кажется. Если, конечно, мы будем до конца верны своему Господу. Как исполнили до конца свой долг перед Высочайшим шесть наших братьев в Экажево, теперь дожидающихся нас в Раю. Среди них – искренний мусульманин (инша Аллах!), муджахид, обладатель знания, труженик исламского призыва имам Са’ид Абу Са’ад аль-Буряти, большинству мусульман известный как Са’ид Бурятский. От рождения – Александр Тихомиров.[..]

http://hunafa.com/?p=3227

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Re: KrustnešuWač! Lielākoties Irāka&Afganistāna&Čečenija.

Mujahida wrote:

Šoreiz pa īstam.

Alhamdu lilLah! Viņš, inšā Allah, ir pelnījis aiziet, lai dzīvotu.

Mūsu mērķis ir Allah, mūsu konstitūcija ir Korāns,
Pravietis ir mūsu līderis, pūles ir mūsu ceļš,
Un nāve Allah dēļ ir augstākā no cerībām.
................................................................
Dod, Allah, lai kļūstam par tādiem kā Tu gribi mūs redzēt!

293

Re: KrustnešuWač! Lielākoties Irāka&Afganistāna&Čečenija.

Mercenaries off the hook
www.atimes.com
By Charles McDermid and Abeer Muhammad

BAGHDAD - Traffic marshal Ali Khalaf Salman casts a flinty, green-eyed gaze over central Baghdad's Nisour Square each day like a Las Vegas pit boss on the prowl. The former commando has been the top cop at the busy urban intersection for years, and he's seen his fair share of "incidents".

"I am an ordinary Iraqi man. I fought in several wars during Saddam's era, and, after the 2003 invasion, I witnessed a lot of blood. It is not easy for a man like me to be haunted by the scene of a killing," said Salman, 40, as he stopped watching the streets for a moment and looked off in to a memory.

"But it's hard for me to forget prying a woman's charred body off a

 

burning car with a hoe after hearing her screaming for my help."

The harrowing scene came on September 16, 2007, in the immediate aftermath of what has become known as the Nisour Square Massacre. This was the day heavily armed troops working for the private security firm formerly known as Blackwater opened fire on a group of some 40 Iraqi civilians, killing 17 and wounding at least 20.

Blackwater claims that its employees, who at the time were escorting a US State Department team, were forced to defend themselves against small arms fire and improvised explosives. Iraqi eyewitnesses, such as Salman, say the attack was strictly one-sided. The US government eventually conceded that "innocent life was lost".

There were at least five seperate investigations of the incident and many conflicting reports. In one finding, the Blackwater guards were said to have tossed grenades into the congested area and received air supprot by at least one Blackwater helicopter which sprayed the crowd with heavy machine gun fire. Blackwater has denied these reports, but news agency Reuters released images after the attack of several vehicles that were torched and left as smoldering heaps at the intersection.

The incident enraged the Iraqi government, which called it a "terrorist act". The world public was appalled, and relations between Baghdad and Washington bottomed out. To most Iraqis, Blackwater became instantly synonymous with the perception of an uncaring occupation force drunk on macho lawlessness and impunity.

The bloody assault exposed the Pentagon's increasing reliance on sometimes brutal hired guns, and pushed Washington into enforcing new regulations for its growing host of military contractors. The US Federal Bureau of Investigation found that most of the deaths "were unjustified and violated deadly-force rules". American soldiers who came upon the scene reportedly called it a "criminal event".

The incident's infamous reputation added to the anger last week when Iraqis learned of a US court's decision to dismiss a federal case against the five Blackwater employees charged with 14 counts of voluntary manslaughter and 20 counts of attempted manslaughter for the Nisour Square shooting.

The subsequent announcement on Thursday that Blackwater, now "re-branded" under the commercial name Xe, had reached out-of-court compensation settlements in seven outstanding civil cases for the use of excessive violence and killings of Iraqis has brought relief to some. An early report by al-Jazeera quoted one victim as calling the as-yet-undisclosed settlement "a victory against the Blackwater firm".

(Also on Thursday, two former Blackwater security guards were arrested in the United States on murder charges in connection with a shooting incident in Afghanistan last May in which two Afghans were killed and a third wounded, the Justice Department said.)

In Iraq, people are left to wonder if financial compensation to victims and victims' families is worth more than a criminal judgment from the US Justice Department, like the one that was thrown out, and if those who fired the bullets will ever be punished for their alleged crimes.

"The American court's decision is a clear violation of human rights. The incident in Nisour Square was a crime against humanity which deserves serious punishment not a settlement," said Ali Raheem al-Asadi, of the rights group Iraqi Foundation. "It is bizarre to have such criminals exonerated by a country that presents itself as advocating for human rights everywhere."

Asadi and other activists are urging the Iraqi government to push the US to hand the shooters over to Iraqi authorities in order to face trial in the country where the event took place.

The United Nations Human Rights Council released a statement on Thursday pressing Baghdad and Washington to pursue the case with "those responsible held accountable". The UN's committee on the use of mercenaries called for oversight in order to "avoid these alleged violations going unpunished in the future".

The Iraqi government has talked tough on the dismissal. Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki rejected the court's December 31 decision as "unfair and unacceptable", and has vowed to prosecute Blackwater in US and Iraqi courts.

Analysts were quick to point out that Maliki is facing an difficult re-election bid in March, and might be exercising a popular public punching-bag such as Blackwater for political gain. An Iraqi legal expert told Asia Times Online that the process of bringing a high-powered private company like Blackwater to any court would be "very, very complex". There is now speculation over which politician or political party will come forward to claim credit for coercing the compensation settlements.

"No one on earth believes that Maliki could beat an American citizen in an American court. It would take magic for him to win [this case] in an Iraqi court," said political analyst and retired political science professor Abdullah Jafar. "Maliki is exactly like the other Iraqi politicians; he is campaigning and promising to do impossible things."

Jafar continued: "For the first time in the history of the democratic process in Iraq after 2003, Iraqi politicians have all agreed on one point with no dispute. That agreement was regarding the American judge's decision in the Blackwater case. They all agreed that the decision is unfair; they all reject it; they all promise to do their best to help the victims.

"But we do not need to ask why. It is very clear: the elections are coming soon. This is all propaganda for the upcoming parliamentary elections."

Washington has also come under criticism for its handling of the case. In his final ruling to dismiss the Blackwater case, Judge Ricardo Urbina blasted US Justice Department prosecutors for botching the case by using inadmissible evidence. A January 6 editorial in the Washington Post called Urbina's verdict "infuriating" but "correct", and blamed the prosecutors for "flouting legal rules and constitutional provisions that made dismissal of the charges inevitable".

The same prosecuting team warned the US Congress as early as January 2008 that the unspecified legal parameters of private military companies and previously unknown State Department immunity deals would present major obstacles in winning the case.

That same month, the advocacy group Human Rights First released a statement that read, "The US government's reaction to the shootings has been characterized by confusion, defensiveness, a multiplicity of uncoordinated ad hoc investigations, and inter-agency finger pointing."

Salman's interpretation of the events that happened in Nisour Square is much more precise. It was a hot summer day, as he tells it, and he was at his post monitoring the traffic roundabout. Just minutes after four Blackwater vehicles entered the congested roadway, he heard the sound of three gunshots. He thought they had been fired into the air until he heard a woman screaming for her son.

He ran in the direction of the voice and until he reached a small car with a young man behind the wheel. The youth was drenched in blood with his hysterical mother beside him.

"I thought the young man was still alive, so I tried to get him out of the car. At that moment, Blackwater guards opened fire on us. I ran and hid behind a nearby kiosk," Salman said. "When the Blackwater vehicles left, I rushed to the woman's car to find two burned, charred bodies. The woman and her son's bodies were stuck to the car. I used a hoe to separate the bodies from the metal."

According to Salman, the image comes back to him at unexpected times, especially when he takes a break from work at the intersection and sits down for a quiet moment.

"It is not the killing or the blood that hurt me. It is the feeling and emotions at that time; a woman wanted to save her son's life in any way, and I wanted to help her in any way. But she could not save her son and I could not help her. Instead, she lost her life too," he said.

In a statement on Thursday, officials of the former Blackwater said they were "pleased" with the settlement agreement that ended the civil lawsuits. One of the complaints claimed the company ran a private army that stalked "the streets of Baghdad killing innocent civilians".

"This [settlement] enables Xe's new management to move the company forward free of the costs and distraction of ongoing litigation, and provides some compensation to Iraqi families," the statement read.

The civil suits were filed on behalf of the victims and victims' families by the famous civil rights defender the Center for Constitutional Rights (CCR) and Susan Burke of Burke O'Neil LLC.
Copies of the civil complaint posted on the CCR website allege that the attack at Nisour Square was "sensleess slaughter" and that Blackwater "fostered a culture of lawlessness amongst its employees, encouraging them to act in the company's financial interests at the expense of innocent human life."

The suits also charge that Blackwater employees were "chemically influenced by steroids and other judgment-altering substances". The suits also charged Blackwater owner, Erik Prince, with making "a series of verbal and written statements that evidenced his support of the wanton killing of those of the Islamic faith".

Blackwater was denied a license to operate in Iraq in January 2009, after the government made several attempts to ban it. According to reports, the company worked without permission until May 2009, when it ended official operations in Iraq as the US declined to renew its contract. The North Carolina-based company, formed in 1997 by two former Navy Seals, remains the largest of the US State Department's military contractors. By one estimate, the company has received over US$1 billion in US government contracts.

In February 2009, when the name-change was made public, the reason given was that the name "Blackwater" might carry too much association with the companies controversial time in the occupation of Iraq. For many Iraqis, the end of the company's name is hardly enough. If not completely unscathed by the alleged events of Nisour Square in 2007, Blackwater seems to many to have left Iraq unpunished.

"I want to see the Blackwater criminals in jail. This will not make me forget the horrible scene, but at least it will relieve my soul," said Salman as he pulled on a long blue coat at the end of his day overseeing Nisour Square. "I feel something has to be done to those criminals. The only way to help that woman is to have them punished."

Abeer Muhammad is senior local editor and Charles McDermid is an editor for the Institute of War and Peace Reporting in Iraq.

(Copyright 2010 Asia Times Online (Holdings) Ltd. All rights reserved. Please contact us about sales, syndication and republishing.)

Dievs zina labāk. Tekstā viss labais no Islāma, bet trūkumi un sliktais no manis. Ja mans dažkārt skarbais tonis kādu aizvaino, tad ziniet, ka tas nav mans nolūks. Mans nolūks un novēlējums ir lai cilvēki patiesi apdomātu savas attiecības ar Dievu un cenšanās piedāvāt Islāmu tāds kāds tas ir. Ja es sev paglaimoju, tad saku, ka man ir nesabalansētas zināšanas. Arī Islāma zinātnieki dažkārt kļūdās un maldina savos tekstos citus, tad jau ahmeds kādu reizi savās amatieriskajās zināšanās noteikti. Šī foruma darbība un mani komentāri nav attiecināmi uz Latvijas muslimu kopienu vai organizācijām. Es stāstu par Islāmu tā kā to saprotu šodien, jau 7 gadus apgūstot Islāmu, un manām zināšanām augot, nākotnē varētu zināt un skaidrot precīzāk, nekļūdīgāk, ar mazāk pārpratumiem un labākā izteiksmes veidā. Es gaidu padomus, bet kritiku uztveru neveselīgi.

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Re: KrustnešuWač! Lielākoties Irāka&Afganistāna&Čečenija.

How the Taliban pressed bin Laden
www.atimes.com
By Gareth Porter

WASHINGTON - Evidence now available from various sources, including recently declassified United States State Department documents, shows that the Taliban regime led by Mullah Mohammad Omar imposed strict isolation on Osama bin Laden after 1998 to prevent him from carrying out any plots against the United States.

The evidence contradicts claims by top officials of the Barack Obama administration that Mullah Omar was complicit in bin Laden's involvement in the al-Qaeda plot to carry out the terrorist attacks in the United States on September 11, 2001. It also bolsters the credibility of Taliban statements in recent months

 

asserting that they have little interest in al-Qaeda's global jihadi aims.

A primary source on the relationship between bin Laden and Mullah Omar before 9/11 is a detailed personal account provided by Egyptian jihadi Abu'l Walid al-Masri and published on Arabic-language jihadist websites in 1997.

Al-Masri had a unique knowledge of the subject because he worked closely with both bin Laden and the Taliban during the period. He was a member of bin Laden's Arab entourage in Afghanistan, but became much more sympathetic to the Afghan cause than bin Laden and other al-Qaeda officials from 1998 through 2001.

The first published English-language report on al-Masri's account, however, was an article in the January issue of the CTC Sentinal, the journal of the Combating Terrorism Center (CTC) at West Point, by Vahid Brown, a fellow at the CTC.

Mullah Omar's willingness to allow bin Laden to remain in Afghanistan was conditioned from the beginning, according to al-Masri's account, on two prohibitions on his activities: bin Laden was forbidden to talk to the media without the consent of the Taliban regime or to make plans to attack US targets.

Former Taliban foreign minister Wakil Ahmed Muttawakil told Inter Press Service in an interview that the regime "put bin Laden in Kandahar to control him better". Kandahar remained the Taliban political headquarters after the organization seized power in 1996.
The August 1998 US cruise missile strikes against training camps in Afghanistan run by bin Laden in retaliation for the bombings of two US embassies in East Africa on August 7, 1998, appears to have had a dramatic impact on Mullah Omar and the Taliban regime's policy toward bin Laden.

Two days after the strike, Omar unexpectedly entered a phone conversation between a State Department official and one of his aides, and told the US official he was unaware of any evidence that bin Laden "had engaged in or planned terrorist acts while on Afghan soil". The Taliban leader said he was "open to dialogue" with the United States and asked for evidence of bin Laden's involvement, according to the State Department cable reporting the conversation.

Only three weeks after Omar asked for evidence against bin Laden, the al-Qaeda leader sought to allay Taliban suspicions by appearing to accept the prohibition by Mullah Omar against planning any actions against the United States.

"There is an opinion among the Taliban that we should not move from within Afghanistan against any other state," bin Laden said in an interview with al-Jazeera. "This was the decision of the Commander of the Faithful, as is known."

Mullah Omar had taken the title "Commander of the Faithful", the term used by some Muslim caliphs in the past to claim to be "leader of the Muslims", in April 1996, five months before Kabul fell to Taliban forces.

During September and October 1998, the Taliban regime apparently sought to position itself to turn bin Laden over to the Saudi government as part of a deal by getting a ruling by the Afghan Supreme Court that he was guilty of the embassy bombings.

In a conversation with the US charge in Islamabad on November 28, 1998, Wakil Ahmed Muttawakil, Omar's spokesman and chief adviser on foreign affairs, referred to a previous Taliban request to the United States for evidence of bin Laden's guilt to be examined by the Afghan Supreme Court, according to the US diplomat's report to the State Department.

Muttawakil said the United States had provided "some papers and a video cassette". but he complained that the video had contained nothing new and had therefore not been submitted to the Supreme Court. He told the charge that the court had ruled that none of the evidence that had been presented warranted the conviction of bin Laden.

Muttawakil said the court trial approach had "not worked" but suggested that the Taliban regime was now carrying out a strategy to "restrict [bin Laden's] activities in such a way that he would decide to leave of his own volition."

On February 10, 1999, the Taliban sent a group of 10 officers to replace bin Laden's own bodyguards, touching off an exchange of gunfire, according to a New York Times story of March 4, 1999. Three days later, bodyguards working for Taliban intelligence and Foreign Affairs Ministry personnel took control of bin Laden's compound near Kandahar and took away his satellite telephone, according to the US and Taliban sources cited by the Times.

Taliban official Abdul Hakeem Mujahid, who was then in the Taliban embassy in Pakistan, confirmed that the 10 Taliban bodyguards had been provided to bin Laden to "supervise him and observe that he will not contact any foreigner or use any communication system in Afghanistan", according to the Times story.

The pressure on bin Laden in 1999 also extended to threats to eliminate al-Qaeda's training camps in Afghanistan. An e-mail to bin Laden from two leading Arab jihadis in Afghanistan in July 1999, later found on a laptop previously belonging to al-Qaeda and purchased by the Wall Street Journal, referred to "problems between you and the Leader of the Faithful" as a "crisis".

The e-mail, published in an article by Alan Cullison in the September 2004 issue of The Atlantic, said: "Talk about closing down the camps has spread." The message even suggested that the jihadis feared the Taliban regime could go so far as to "kick them out" of Afghanistan.

In the face of new Taliban hostility, bin Laden sought to convince Mullah Omar that he had given his personal allegiance to Omar as a Muslim. In April 2001, bin Laden referred publicly to having sworn allegiance to Mullah Omar as the "Commander of the Faithful".

But al-Masri recalls that bin Laden had refused to personally swear such an oath of allegiance to Omar in 1998-99, and had asked al-Masri himself to give the oath to Omar in his stead. Al-Masri suggests that bin Laden deliberately avoided giving the oath of allegiance to Omar personally so that he would be able to argue within the Arab jihadi community that he was not bound by Omar's strictures on his activities.

Even in summer 2001, as the Taliban regime became increasingly dependent on foreign jihadi troop contingents, including Arabs trained in bin Laden's camps, for its defense against the military advances of the Northern Alliance, Mullah Omar found yet another way to express his unhappiness with bin Laden's presence.

After a series of clashes between al-Qaeda forces and those of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), the Taliban leader intervened to give overall control of foreign volunteer forces to Tahir Yuldash of the IMU, according to a blog post last October by Leah Farrall, an Australian specialist on jihadi politics in Afghanistan.

In late January, Geoff Morrell, the spokesman for US Defense Secretary Robert Gates, suggested that the United States could not negotiate with Mullah Omar because he has "the blood of thousands of Americans on his hands", implying that he had knowingly allowed bin Laden's planning of the 9/11 attacks.

Gareth Porter is an investigative historian and journalist specializing in US national security policy. The paperback edition of his latest book, Perils of Dominance: Imbalance of Power and the Road to War in Vietnam, was published in 2006.

Dievs zina labāk. Tekstā viss labais no Islāma, bet trūkumi un sliktais no manis. Ja mans dažkārt skarbais tonis kādu aizvaino, tad ziniet, ka tas nav mans nolūks. Mans nolūks un novēlējums ir lai cilvēki patiesi apdomātu savas attiecības ar Dievu un cenšanās piedāvāt Islāmu tāds kāds tas ir. Ja es sev paglaimoju, tad saku, ka man ir nesabalansētas zināšanas. Arī Islāma zinātnieki dažkārt kļūdās un maldina savos tekstos citus, tad jau ahmeds kādu reizi savās amatieriskajās zināšanās noteikti. Šī foruma darbība un mani komentāri nav attiecināmi uz Latvijas muslimu kopienu vai organizācijām. Es stāstu par Islāmu tā kā to saprotu šodien, jau 7 gadus apgūstot Islāmu, un manām zināšanām augot, nākotnē varētu zināt un skaidrot precīzāk, nekļūdīgāk, ar mazāk pārpratumiem un labākā izteiksmes veidā. Es gaidu padomus, bet kritiku uztveru neveselīgi.

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Re: KrustnešuWač! Lielākoties Irāka&Afganistāna&Čečenija.

Book review
Osama bin Laden, my father
Growing Up bin Laden by Jean Sasson, Omar bin Laden and Najwa bin Laden.
www.atimes.com

Reviewed by Simon Allison

Omar bin Laden - fourth son turned peace-loving refusenik of Osama - is reliant on the good graces of a number of easily offended people. There's King Abdullah, the Saudi monarch, who agreed to re-issue Omar's Saudi passport after Osama bin Laden renounced Saudi citizenship on behalf of all his immediate family (the king denied the same privilege to one of Osama's younger sons).

There's Hosni Mubarak, the Egyptian president who is not renowned for his ability to accept criticism, who has allowed

 

Omar to live and work in Egypt with his British wife, Zaina.

There's also Bashir al-Assad, hereditary president of Syria, where most of the other members of Omar bin Laden's family reside - excluding those still in Afghanistan or possibly elsewhere.

His newly released biographical book, ghostwritten on behalf of Omar and his mother Najwa, is therefore not the place to look for hard-hitting political analysis. Light on dates and facts, its tone is almost sycophantic when it comes to discussing anything that might impact his present situation.

A typical example is his discussion of the fierce division between Osama and the Saudi government over whether to allow Americans to fight Saddam Hussein from Saudi Arabian soil: "[The Saudi government] calmly and wisely attempted to defuse the quarrel," Omar writes. Omar's mother, Osama's first wife, is even more restrained; her chapters are a simple account of married life, and it is clear that she is holding back. Still legally married to Osama, her descriptions are superficially interesting, but add little to one's conception of Osama bin Laden, the husband.

Omar's accounts are a different story. The person he can afford to offend, doing so with intelligence and insight, is his father. Although at times prone to overly explicit condemnations (one suspects he has an eye on future visa applications; he was recently rejected from Britain despite his wife's nationality), Omar's story is made all the more intriguing, and believable, by the evident pain his father has caused him.

Growing up in Jeddah, where Osama was an Afghanistan war hero (the only private citizen in Saudi allowed to carry a firearm, he never let his AK-47 leave his side) and the leader of his own intensely loyal and reverent militia, the young Omar looked up to him with love, respect and fear, although little affection; Osama was not prone to showing emotions, and all the bin Laden children craved his attention.

Jokes and toys were forbidden in the household, as were modern conveniences as Osama's conservatism became more pronounced. After the family's later move to a compound in Khartoum, the capital of Sudan, Osama banned fridges and air-conditioning, and was even happy to make normally pampered guests from the Gulf swelter in the midsummer heat.

Despite this, Omar is wistful in his recollections of life in Sudan. The family was not isolated, living in a mainly expatriate compound, and the children were occasionally able to play with other families, although never Christians. Ignoring the odd assassination attempt - during which Omar and his brothers cowered with their tutors in a closet while the killers looked for Osama - everyday life was not hugely different from the life of any expatriate family in Khartoum.

The recollections of these early years in Omar's life are largely informed by his youth and his understandable ignorance of what was going on around him. His innocence, however, was shattered by one incident that occurred near the end of the bin Ladens' stay in Sudan.

A teenage friend of his, the son of one the leaders of al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya in Khartoum, was brutally gang-raped by a group of men. The motivation for the rape was not clear to the young Omar. Damning photographs were taken and ended up in the hands of Ayman al-Zawahiri, believed to be Osama bin Laden's number two. Omar was not fond of Zawahiri. "I was not often in Dr Zawahiri's presence, and for that I was glad. From the first moment I met the man, he left me feeling unsettled despite the fact my father respected him ... I felt that nothing good could come from the association [between Osama and Zawahiri]."

Zawahiri was incensed by the graphic pictures of the rape, believing that somehow the teenager was at fault. Despite protestations from the boy's father, Zawahiri quickly sentenced the boy to death for homosexual behavior. He was dragged into a room where Zawahiri shot him in the head. Osama bin Laden, despite being fully aware of the incident, refused to intervene. "For the first time, I realized that some of the men surrounding my father might be dangerous, even to the sons of Osama bin Laden," Omar writes. "One question kept troubling me: why would my highly educated and soft-spoken father hang about with such ruffians, even if they were faithful to his cause? I really could not understand."

Omar's unusual but hitherto sheltered life (it's all relative) changed dramatically when his father selected him alone of his brothers to go on a scouting mission to Afghanistan. Sudan, under intense international pressure to expel Osama bin Laden after an assassination attempt on Mubarak was thought to involve him, told bin Laden he had to go. Sasson, who by way of context provides brief notes on Osama's political and militant activities at key stages, states that the Sudanese government first offered him to Saudi Arabia and then to the US, who rejected him because, at the time, the US government had no legal basis on which to arrest him.

Osama was not rejected by Afghanistan. In the midst of a civil war in 1996, with the Taliban yet to consolidate power, bin Laden was welcomed by an old friend from the war against the Soviets, Mullah Nourallah, a prominent leader in Jalalabad, with gifts of land in Jalalabad and an entire mountain in the subsequently infamous Tora Bora range. It was there that US forces are believed to have come the closest to capturing Osama bin Laden. But, as Omar says: "He would be hard to find there. No one knew those mountains like my father. I remembered that he recognized all the big boulders, knowing exactly the distance from one to the other."
Life was hard for the bin Ladens in Afghanistan. The rest of the family soon arrived and settled into their stark new home halfway up Osama's mountain. All supplies had to be brought by foot, and the boys spent their days gathering firewood to provide a little warmth against the freezing winter temperatures (the girls, as they had been everywhere, were not allowed out of the house; a source of some frustration for the usually quiescent Najwa).

Osama was constantly shuttling between there and the training camp he was setting up in an old Soviet base. Omar and the other elder brothers began to be trained in the family business, and soon became just as attached to their AK-47s as their father. As al-Qaeda became more established in Afghanistan, and once the Taliban were firmly in control of the country, Osama felt safe enough to move his family to old army quarters on the outskirts of his training camp, and his children began to receive the same training as other militants.

This included lengthy and intensive religious training sessions, which Omar generally found repetitive and boring, as apparently did most of the militants. He soon grew discontented with his father and made plans to leave with whatever family he could take; plans which were not hugely opposed by Osama, by then disenchanted with his fourth-eldest son.

Although Growing up Bin Laden is largely a personal account, focusing more on the character rather than the actions of Osama, there are insights that shed interesting light on the political events of the time. Perhaps the most revealing incident was the visit of a furious Mullah Omar, the Taliban leader, to al-Qaeda's training camp in the aftermath of the US Embassy bombings in East Africa.

Mullah Omar ignored custom completely by refusing a meal with Osama and by insisting that he be the only person to sit on a chair, a clear indication of hierarchy. He also ignored Osama's greetings, refusing to exchange salaams, a sign of great disrespect. Mullah Omar ordered al-Qaeda to leave Afghanistan immediately, but Osama was able to negotiate to stay for another year and a half.

His point was a good one: "Where would I move my people to?" he said, illustrating the tensions between al-Qaeda and the Taliban, which belies the idea that the two organizations are cozy bedfellows with similar ideals.

In another illustrative passage, Osama explains to Omar how he intends to hasten the downfall of Israel and America. "That's what we did with the Russians. We bled the blood from their body in Afghanistan. Those Russians spent all of their wealth on the war in Afghanistan. When they could no longer finance the war, they fled. After fleeing, their whole system collapsed. Holy warriors defending Afghanistan are the ones responsible for bringing a huge nation to its knees. We can do the same things with America and Israel. We only have to be patient. Their defeat and collapse may not come in my lifetime. It may not come in your lifetime, but it will come. One day Muslims will rule the world."

Eight years into the US invasion of Afghanistan, with more troops and billions of dollars being poured into the conflict, Osama's game plan is perhaps looking more feasible than that of United States President Barack Obama's.

Above all, Growing up Bin Laden is the story of a father and a son, both of whom disappoint the expectations of the other. Given who his father is, however, this reflects well on Omar, and we should be lauding his courage in standing up to the world's most wanted terrorist rather than shunning him for his family name.

The book, despite its propensity for strategic flattery and the self-consciousness with which it is written, is necessary reading for anyone looking to go beyond the hype of the bin Laden name, and it is a salient example that Osama's brand of militant Islam holds no appeal even to his chosen son. Perhaps Britain should give him that visa after all.

Growing Up bin Laden: Osama's Wife and Son Take Us Inside Their Secret World. Jean Sasson (author), Omar bin Laden (author), Najwa bin Laden (author). St Martin's Press (October 27, 2009. SBN-10: 0312560168. Price US$25,99, 352 pages.

Dievs zina labāk. Tekstā viss labais no Islāma, bet trūkumi un sliktais no manis. Ja mans dažkārt skarbais tonis kādu aizvaino, tad ziniet, ka tas nav mans nolūks. Mans nolūks un novēlējums ir lai cilvēki patiesi apdomātu savas attiecības ar Dievu un cenšanās piedāvāt Islāmu tāds kāds tas ir. Ja es sev paglaimoju, tad saku, ka man ir nesabalansētas zināšanas. Arī Islāma zinātnieki dažkārt kļūdās un maldina savos tekstos citus, tad jau ahmeds kādu reizi savās amatieriskajās zināšanās noteikti. Šī foruma darbība un mani komentāri nav attiecināmi uz Latvijas muslimu kopienu vai organizācijām. Es stāstu par Islāmu tā kā to saprotu šodien, jau 7 gadus apgūstot Islāmu, un manām zināšanām augot, nākotnē varētu zināt un skaidrot precīzāk, nekļūdīgāk, ar mazāk pārpratumiem un labākā izteiksmes veidā. Es gaidu padomus, bet kritiku uztveru neveselīgi.

296

Re: KrustnešuWač! Lielākoties Irāka&Afganistāna&Čečenija.

Book: Counter-insurgency, then and now
A Question of Command by Mark Moyar
www.atimes.com
Reviewed by Brian M Downing

In Norman Mailer's The Naked and the Dead, an operation on the fictional island of Anopopei comes to a successful conclusion, but owing to the campaign's intricacies, no one is quite sure why. Headquarters writes a report crediting the commanding general and in time it becomes official history. Many campaigns might be a bit like Anopopei.

Counter-insurgency thinking is once again much discussed, as it was 50 years ago. In the early 1960s, the United States was reeling from Fidel Castro's seizure of power in Cuba and uncertain how to deal with Maoism and its apparent offshoots in Southeast Asia. The John F Kennedy administration sought a way to prevent

 

more Cubas and thought it had found the answer in the doctrine of counter-insurgency.

Ideas from counter-insurgencies in Malaya, the Philippines and Algeria informed US special forces and Central Intelligence Agency operations in Laos and Vietnam throughout the 1960s and early 1970s. Though successful in places, supporters ran into problems with nationalism, corrupt officials and institutional barriers in the US military. The Vietnam War led to the military being vilified at home, brought disciplinary problems inside the once proud institution and ended ignominiously. Counter-insurgency foundered as generals felt that expertise in it would encourage politicians to put it to use in another quagmire.

In recent years, the US has found itself facing sizable insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan and smaller ones in Somalia, Yemen and the Philippines. Veterans with experience in counter-insurgency are few and far between - and mostly long retired. The military is racing to build doctrines and cadres for these new wars.
Moyar, a professor at the US Marine Corps University and author of a re-examination of the Vietnam War, presents a perspective on counter-insurgency that will find audiences in and out of the military. He posits three counter-insurgency schools. The Population-Centered approach seeks to understand the roots of an insurgency and then develop and implement programs to win popular support. The Enemy-Centered approach seeks to break the will and capabilities of insurgents, principally through the use of political and military power.

Moyar presents a third way. The Leader-Centered approach sees insurgent warfare as a contest between opposing elites - insurgent and counter-insurgent - to win popular support. There are social grievances, often profound ones, but grievances are seen as the issue in a violent, organizational contest - a point that nicely distinguishes the author from many who see insurgents as having the high ground on grievances.

The basic principles of such warfare are straightforward and largely undisputed: construction of local intelligence networks; cooperation between political and military personnel; local popular support; local self-defense forces; and the protracted presence of counter-insurgency programs and personnel. The elite with superior personnel in the field - those with initiative, flexibility, creativity, judgment, empathy, charisma and sociability - will put these principles to work and emerge victorious. This muddles the counter-insurgency approaches, but that's social science and Moyar's argument merits better consideration than quibbling about definitions.

The bulk of the book comprises nine case studies ranging from the American Civil War (parts of which were indeed insurgencies) to the ongoing wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Moyar's accounts are necessarily brief but no one will doubt he has done a great deal of research, though points of disagreement are inevitable.

An obvious problem in his cases will occur to many. Moyar sees insurgent warfare as a contest between two elites, but his cases examine, almost exclusively, only one side of the contest. Most accounts give vignettes of counter-insurgent leaders and important engagements, leaving readers to conclude that they outwitted their insurgent foes and that the superior elite won out. That might be unavoidable given the subject matter and some issues are too pressing to wait a decade or two until more data accumulate. But more emphasis on the complexities of insurgent warfare would have been helpful.

Where do we get such men?
Moyar sees leadership as part nature and part nurture but believes that military organizations - or at least the US military - can groom sufficient numbers of officers with the critical attributes to win. He provides an appendix with a series of questions aimed at identifying ideal officers for counter-insurgency.

We would do well to dismiss the caricature of American high-ranking officers as unimaginative martinets, but there are institutional obstacles to developing the type of officers Moyar advocates. There has long been conflict between advocates of counter-insurgency and those who see conventional orientations (armor, mechanized infantry, air superiority) as the appropriate posture for the US military. Counter-insurgency advocates lost out during the Vietnam War, but apparent successes in Iraq and years of directionless efforts in Afghanistan have given them the upper hand in the Pentagon.

Nonetheless, the military is an organization with a strong preference for predictable methods and unwavering respect for the chain of command. The independence and creativity of counter-insurgency efforts, tailored to conditions in specific locales and not to expectations back at headquarters, will not interact smoothly with the organizational structure. Special forces personnel in Afghanistan complain of having to clear even small operations with higher-ups - a time-consuming and stifling procedure.

Advisors in the Central Highlands of Vietnam, owing to their remoteness from Saigon, enjoyed a great deal of leeway, but today's communications allow local ops to be supervised by provincial commanders, officers and embassy personnel and consultants in Kabul, and even their superiors back in the US. Generals do not easily relinquish operational control.

Moyar's emphasis is on senior officers - General Creighton Abrams in Vietnam, General David Petraeus in Iraq and Afghanistan. Counter-insurgencies, however, depend greatly on junior officers - lieutenants and captains are critical - who deal with locals, build intelligence networks, provide the backbone for militias in their early stages and see to it that aid arrives in the villages. It is the brass that Moyar sees identifying the new breed of officers and deploying them throughout the theater of operations. But no general, however astute and persevering, can impose his ideas and expectations all the way down the chain of command to the company and platoon levels, and training programs back at Fort Bragg and Marine Corps Base Quantico cannot produce this new breed in large numbers.

Most of the personnel on counter-insurgencies are not officers; they are enlisted men and women - privates, corporals and sergeants. It is they who will have far more interaction with villagers than all the generals and colonels in field headquarters or back in Kabul ever will. Most enlisted personnel are young - many under the age of 22 - and carry along on their deployments many predispositions and prejudices of upbringings back home. This raises the possibility if not the near certainty of misunderstandings and conflicts with villagers.

In Afghanistan today, many soldiers are on their fifth combat deployments, and long experience from Anbar to Kunar has taught them that many locals are sympathetic to insurgents - a perception, right or wrong, that will be exaggerated and make them less likely to interact with locals in the manner prescribed in field manuals and expected by distant officers. Generals cannot prevent it, and inasmuch as most of them have never served in combat as junior officers, they might not even understand it.

Problems in implementation: Nation, tribe and region
Even the best-led counter-insurgencies encounter problems with nationalism, tribalism, corruption, geography, international support for respective sides, cultural antagonisms and popular support back home. Though not absent in Moyar's case histories, they are not sufficiently treated and we are left to believe the proper personnel can deftly overcome them.

Nationalism is usually considered the exclusive asset of insurgents, but it presents opportunities for counter-insurgents as well. The Vietcong insurgency was based on local grievances. The introduction of American ground troops in 1965 resonated with the return of French troops 20 years earlier and infused the insurgency with nationalist energies. But complexities abounded.

The US was able, in certain places, to build counter-insurgency programs that successfully detached local populations from the insurgency. US programs built irrigation systems, schools and roads, which eased nationalist resentments but at the same time underscored the corruption and ineptitude of South Vietnamese officials. It was clear to most villagers that the latter hoarded resources and used them for personal gain. Acceptance of American personnel increased but loyalty to the Saigon government did not.

Programs in Afghanistan face similar problems. Eight years after the Taliban's expulsion, Western forces have failed to live up to earlier promises to help rebuild the country and then leave and they now face nationalist-based hostility - a sentiment strengthened by civilian casualties over the years. Further, Western forces are increasingly seen as acting with northern peoples to impose their rule on the Pashtun regions.

Tribalism presents a different environment from the ones in many counter-insurgency cases. Negotiating with tribal elders has advantages in that deals can be struck and then, through authority and entreaty, be imposed on sub-tribes and clans. In many parts of Afghanistan, however, tribal authority has been badly damaged by decades of war, leaving many to accept the Taliban as the new ordering body. Even where tribal elders remain influential, Kabul and Western forces are not held in high regard, though elders will listen to programs that benefit them.

Success with one tribe will not necessarily spread into adjacent regions in the classic oil-spot technique. Success with one tribe may lead to enmity from another. Such was the case in the early 1980s when the cooperation of tribes in Paktia province led to attacks from tribes in nearby Wardak. This is not to say that tribal diplomacy will make little headway, only that success can sow the seeds of opposition. And the Taliban are adroit enough to cultivate that opposition. Indeed, they have a formidable head start in tribal negotiations, and a daunting cultural advantage as well.

The Soviet Union's war in Afghanistan in the 1980s and the ongoing one there now might offer insights on the relative importance of international context and leadership. The mujahideen forces that fought the Soviet Union and its Afghan allies to a standstill had little in the way of coherent leadership. There were several major resistance groups under which there were scores of bands only barely organized. Many groups, such as Hizb-i Islami (Gulbuddin Hekmatyar), fought each other as much as they fought the Russians. Command was determined by seniority and zealotry and kinship, not by organizational method. The Soviet Union initially relied on brute force but in time adopted counter-insurgency principles while the Kabul government negotiated with tribal elders and got many to side with it.

Critically, the Soviet Union and its ally in Kabul had little if any international support. The mujahideen enjoyed generous support from the United States and Saudi Arabia; Pakistan offered sanctuaries and funneled arms and money to the fighters; and much of the Islamic world sent money and volunteers. Unable to maintain public support for the war, the Soviet Union withdrew in 1989 and cut off subsidies to Kabul a few years later. With neither effective leadership nor common cause, the mujahideen suffered large-scale desertions and began to fight each other.

Perhaps paradoxically, the international context today greatly disfavors the successors to the mujahideen. The Taliban are opposed by most foreign powers, including the US, India, Iran, Russia, China and the former Soviet republics to the north. Only far-flung donors and Pakistan support the Taliban. The latter now faces international pressure to nudge the Taliban toward a negotiated settlement.

Emphasis on leadership will come naturally from military institutions. And no one who has seen a tactful captain encourage a reluctant militiaman or dress down a thieving police chief will doubt the importance of savvy officers. But minimizing the intricacies that counter-insurgencies present will not adequately inform policy makers and publics about the wars they have embarked upon and will likely embark upon in the future.

Nor, outside of inspiring young officers, will it be especially helpful to personnel who face educations in Afghanistan and elsewhere. Most of those who have already served in counter-insurgency operations have already learned those hard lessons.

Dievs zina labāk. Tekstā viss labais no Islāma, bet trūkumi un sliktais no manis. Ja mans dažkārt skarbais tonis kādu aizvaino, tad ziniet, ka tas nav mans nolūks. Mans nolūks un novēlējums ir lai cilvēki patiesi apdomātu savas attiecības ar Dievu un cenšanās piedāvāt Islāmu tāds kāds tas ir. Ja es sev paglaimoju, tad saku, ka man ir nesabalansētas zināšanas. Arī Islāma zinātnieki dažkārt kļūdās un maldina savos tekstos citus, tad jau ahmeds kādu reizi savās amatieriskajās zināšanās noteikti. Šī foruma darbība un mani komentāri nav attiecināmi uz Latvijas muslimu kopienu vai organizācijām. Es stāstu par Islāmu tā kā to saprotu šodien, jau 7 gadus apgūstot Islāmu, un manām zināšanām augot, nākotnē varētu zināt un skaidrot precīzāk, nekļūdīgāk, ar mazāk pārpratumiem un labākā izteiksmes veidā. Es gaidu padomus, bet kritiku uztveru neveselīgi.

297

Re: KrustnešuWač! Lielākoties Irāka&Afganistāna&Čečenija.

A fight against the odds
By Nick Turse and Tom Engelhardt
www.atimes.com

In his book on World War II in the Pacific, War Without Mercy, John Dower tells an extraordinary tale about the changing American image of the Japanese fighting man. In the period before the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor, it was well accepted in military and political circles that the Japanese were inferior fighters on the land, in the air and at sea - "little men", in the phrase of the moment. It was a commonplace of "expert" opinion, for instance, that the Japanese had supposedly congenital nearsightedness and certain inner-ear defects, while lacking individualism, making it hard to show initiative. In battle, the result


was poor pilots in Japanese-made (and so inferior) planes, who could not fly effectively at night or launch successful attacks.

In the wake of their precision assault on Pearl Harbor, their wiping out of US air power in the Philippines in the first moments of the war, and a sweeping set of other victories, the Japanese suddenly went from "little men" to supermen in the American imagination (without ever passing through a human phase). They became "invincible" - natural-born jungle- and night-fighters, as well as "utterly ruthless, utterly cruel and utterly blind to any of the values which make up our civilization".

Sound familiar? It should. Following September 11, 2001, news headlines screamed "A NEW DAY OF INFAMY" and the attacks were instantly labeled "the Pearl Harbor of the 21st century". Soon enough, al-Qaeda, like the Japanese in 1941, went from a distant threat - the George W Bush administration, on coming into office, paid next to no attention to al-Qaeda's possible plans - to a team of arch-villains with little short of superpowers. After all, they had already destroyed some of the mightiest buildings on the planet, were known to be on the verge of seizing weapons of mass destruction, and, if nothing was done, might soon enough turn the Muslim world into their "caliphate".

Al-Qaeda was suddenly an organization against which you wouldn't launch anything less than the full strength of the armed forces of the world's "sole superpower". To a surprising extent, they are still dealt with this way. You can feel it, for instance, in the recent 24/7 panic over the thoroughly inept underwear bomber and the sudden threat of a few hundred self-proclaimed al-Qaeda members in Yemen. You can feel it in the ramping up of the Af-Pak war.

You can hear it in the "debate" over moving al-Qaeda detainees from Guantanamo to US maximum security prisons. The way some politicians talk, you might think those detainees were all Lex Luthors and Magnetos, super-villains incapable of being held by any prison, just like the almost magically impossible-to-find Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri in the wild borderlands of Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Because most Americans have never dealt with or thought of al-Qaeda as a group made up of actual human beings or accepted that, for every televisually striking success, they have an operation (or several) that go bust, the US can't begin to imagine what it's actually up against. The current president, like the previous one, claims that the US is "at war". If so, it's a war of one, since al-Qaeda and the US military are essentially not in the same war-fighting universe, which helps explain why repeatedly knocking off significant portions of al-Qaeda's leadership (even if never finding bin Laden and Zawahiri) doesn't seem to end the threat.

But let's stop here and try, for a moment, to imagine these two enemies side-by-side in the same universe of war. What, in that case, would the lineup of forces look like?

Assessing al-Qaeda's 'troops'
According to US intelligence estimates, there are currently about 100 al-Qaeda fighters in Afghanistan, as well as "several hundred" in Pakistan and, so the latest reports tell us, a similar number in Yemen. Members of al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (Algeria, Mali and Mauritania) and those based in Somalia undoubtedly fall into the same category at several hundred each. According to authorities from the Iraq Study Group to the US State Department, even at the height of the insurgency and civil war in Iraq, al-Qaeda in Mesopotamia never had more than 1,300-4,000 active fighters. Today, it is believed to consist only of "small, roving cells".

Combined, these groups - think of them as al-Qaeda's shock troops, add up to perhaps 2,100 fighters, about one-fifth the number of US troops now based in Italy. As the 9/11 attacks, the intelligence on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction and the failure to disrupt the underwear bomber's plot indicate, US intelligence has long been flying blind, but even if al-Qaeda turned out to have sleeper cells with 300 additional committed members in every nation on Earth, its clandestine operatives would only moderately exceed the number of US forces now based in Germany.

Al-Qaeda does have some "training camps" in the backlands of countries like Yemen, and it has civilian supporters, financiers and other scattered allies. Over the years, and sometimes with good reason, Washington has lumped Taliban fighters in Afghanistan and Pakistan with al-Qaeda and counted various militant groups, including Somalia's al-Shabab Islamic rebels, as al-Qaeda affiliates. Add such fighters in and you would swell these numbers by many thousands.

Additionally, al-Qaeda has an arsenal of weaponry. Members have access to rocket-propelled grenades, small arms of various sorts, the materials for making deadly roadside bombs, car bombs, and of course underwear bombs.

Assessing America's troops
United States efforts to crush al-Qaeda have certainly not failed for lack of resources. The US military has spent about US$1 trillion on its post-9/11 wars so far. It has an army, a navy, an air force and a marine corps which, like the navy, has its very own air force. It possesses trillions of dollars in weapons, materiel and other assets. It can mobilize spy satellites, advanced fighter planes and bombers, high-tech drones and helicopters, fleets of trucks, tanks and other armored vehicles. It has advanced missiles and smart bombs, aircraft carriers, nuclear submarines and state-of-the-art ships in all shapes and sizes.

It also has incredibly well-trained special operations forces - almost 56,000 elite troops, including the US Army Rangers and Special Forces, Navy SEALs and Special Boat Teams, Air Force Special Tactics Teams and Marine Corps Special Operations Battalions, armed with incredibly advanced weaponry. It has military academies that churn out highly-educated officers and specialized training camps, schools and universities. It has more than half-a-million buildings and structures on more than 800 bases sitting on millions of hectares of prime real estate scattered around the world, including in or near lands where various branches of al-Qaeda operate.

In addition, the US military has manpower - lots of it. All told, the United States has approximately 1.4 million active duty men and women under arms and another 1.3 million reserve personnel. It employs more than 700,000 civilians in support roles - from stocking shelves and serving food at stateside bases to assisting in intelligence analysis in war zones - and utilizes untold tens of thousands of private security hired-guns and various other kinds of private contractors all around the globe.

These numbers would be further swelled by intelligence agents who aid military efforts, including 100,000 members of the civilian intelligence community. And then there are the allies the US can draw on, ranging, in Afghanistan alone, from the Afghan army and police to tens of thousands of North Atlantic Treaty Organization and other foreign allied troops from more than 40 countries.

Comparing the sides
Even excluding from the US side of the equation all those US reserves, Defense Department civilians, intelligence operatives and analysts, private contractors and allies of various sorts, if you compare the two enemies in the current "war", you still end up with either the Mark of the Beast or a marker for futility.

The active duty US military alone enjoys a 666:1 advantage over the estimated number of al-Qaeda fighters in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Yemen, Iraq, Algeria, Mauritania, Mali and Somalia. Adding in the reserves, the ratio jumps to an embarrassingly-high 1,286:1. Even if you were to factor in those hordes of non-existent al-Qaeda sleeper agents, 300 each for 195 countries from Australia to the Vatican City, the US military would still enjoy a 23:1 advantage (or 45:1 if you included the reserves, now regularly sent into war zones on multiple tours of duty).

In sum, after the better part of a decade of conflict, the US has spent trillions of taxpayer dollars on bullets and bombs, soldiers and drones. It has waged wars in Iraq and Afghanistan that have yet to end, launched strikes in Pakistan, Yemen and Somalia, dispatched special ops troops to those nations and others, like the Philippines, and built or expanded hundreds of new bases all over the world. Yet Osama bin Laden remains at large and al-Qaeda continues to target and kill Americans.

Open-source al-Qaeda
Founded in 1988, bin Laden's al-Qaeda formally issued a "declaration of war" on the United States in 1996, primarily over the US military presence in the Middle East. While Washington has been hunting bin Laden and al-Qaeda since the mid-1990s, a post-9/11 congressional resolution authorized the president to use force against that group and the Taliban. Ever since, the Pentagon has been waging one of the most ineffective campaigns of modern times in an effort to destroy it.

During these years, Bush declared himself a "war president" heading a country "at war" and living in "war time". In a milder way, President Barack Obama has repeatedly declared the US to be "at war" and, as in his surge speech at the West Point military academy in December, has identified the main enemy in that war as al-Qaeda. In the process, the US military has unleashed tremendous destructive power on parts of Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq, Yemen and Somalia, causing the deaths of al-Qaeda fighters, non-al-Qaeda militants and innocent civilians. Thousands of its own troops have died and tens of thousands have been wounded in the process, not to mention the losses to allied forces.

In these years, new al-Qaeda "affiliates" like al-Qaeda in Iraq/Mesopotamia have nonetheless sprung to life regularly and, as in Yemen, have even been officially crushed, only to be reborn. These groups have often made up their own "al-Qaeda" membership requirements, and focused on their own chosen targets. Meanwhile, al-Qaeda wannabes and look-alikes have proliferated and the organization (or those sympathetic to it or praising it) has reportedly spurred further attacks in the US and encouraged men from New York to California, Nigeria to Jordan, to join the movement, and then work, fight, kill and die for it, sometimes in attacks on Americans.

Al-Qaeda has no tanks, Humvees, nuclear submarines, or aircraft carriers, no fleets of attack helicopters or fighter jets. Al-Qaeda has never launched a spy satellite and isn't developing advanced drone technology (although it may be hacking into US video feeds). Al-Qaeda specializes in low-budget operations ranging from the incredibly deadly to the incredibly ineffectual - from murderous car bombs and airplanes-used-as-missiles to faulty shoe- and underwear-explosives.

Comparisons of the strengths of the US military and al-Qaeda "at war" would be absurd, if it weren't for the fact that the United States actually went to war against such a group. It was a decision about as effective as firing a machine gun at a swarm of gnats. Some may die, but the process is visibly self-defeating.

In the present "war on terror", called by whatever name (or, as at present, by no name at all), the two "sides" might as well be in different worlds. After all, al-Qaeda today isn't even an organization in the normal sense of the term, no less a fighting bureaucracy. It is a loose collection of ideas and a looser collection of individuals waging open-source warfare.

You don't sign up for al-Qaeda the way you would for the US Army. If you and two friends are sitting around a table in some country and you're angry, alienated and dissatisfied with the state of the world, you can simply claim to adhere to the basic ideas of Osama bin Laden and declare yourself al-Qaeda in [fill in the blank]. Who then gets into your organization and how you link up, if at all, with other "al-Qaedas" is up to you.

That's why groups like al-Qaeda in Mesopotamia are always referred to in the press as "homegrown". What you have, then, in this post-war-on-terror war is a massive global military force aided and abetted by allied troops, "native" forces, and all sorts of corporate contractors facing off against something fluid and "homegrown", fierce but strangely undefined, constantly morphing and shape-shifting. Every one of its "members" could be destroyed without the "enemy" being destroyed, because the enemy is a set of ideas, however extreme or strange to most Americans.

The Pentagon, with its giant bureaucracy and its miles of offices and corridors, is the headquarters of the US war effort, but there is no central al-Qaeda headquarters, not in Afghanistan or Pakistan - not anywhere. There is probably no longer even an "al-Qaeda central". Osama bin Laden has vanished or, for all we know, may be dead. Think of it, at best, as an open-source organization that is remarkably capable of replicating by a process of self-franchising.

Isn't it time, then, to stop imagining al-Qaeda as a complex organization of terrorist supermen capable of committing super-deeds, or as an organization that bears any resemblance to a traditional enemy military force? With al-Qaeda, the path of war has undoubtedly been the road to perdition - as we should have discovered by now, more than one trillion dollars later.

When this "war" began, Bush and his followers, like bin Laden and his followers, were eager to proclaim future "victory" and to say with bravado to the other side: "Bring 'em on!" The word "victory" has long since fled Washington's lips, along with boasts that the US is a new Rome.

So far, no matter how many of its operatives may be dead, "victory" remains on the lips of those calling themselves al-Qaeda-in-anywhere. After all, they did get Washington to "bring 'em on" and the results have been disastrous and draining for the United States. The US military has killed many al-Qaeda operatives, but it cannot annihilate its appeal by "surging" in Afghanistan and making war, with all the civilian destruction involved, in Muslim lands.

It's time to put al-Qaeda back in perspective - a human perspective, which would include its stunning successes, its dismal failures and its monumental goof-ups, as well as its unrealizable dreams. (No, Virginia, there will never be an al-Qaeda caliphate in or across the Greater Middle East.) The fact is: al-Qaeda is not an apocalyptic threat. Its partisans can cause damage, but only Americans can bring down this country.

Dievs zina labāk. Tekstā viss labais no Islāma, bet trūkumi un sliktais no manis. Ja mans dažkārt skarbais tonis kādu aizvaino, tad ziniet, ka tas nav mans nolūks. Mans nolūks un novēlējums ir lai cilvēki patiesi apdomātu savas attiecības ar Dievu un cenšanās piedāvāt Islāmu tāds kāds tas ir. Ja es sev paglaimoju, tad saku, ka man ir nesabalansētas zināšanas. Arī Islāma zinātnieki dažkārt kļūdās un maldina savos tekstos citus, tad jau ahmeds kādu reizi savās amatieriskajās zināšanās noteikti. Šī foruma darbība un mani komentāri nav attiecināmi uz Latvijas muslimu kopienu vai organizācijām. Es stāstu par Islāmu tā kā to saprotu šodien, jau 7 gadus apgūstot Islāmu, un manām zināšanām augot, nākotnē varētu zināt un skaidrot precīzāk, nekļūdīgāk, ar mazāk pārpratumiem un labākā izteiksmes veidā. Es gaidu padomus, bet kritiku uztveru neveselīgi.

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Re: KrustnešuWač! Lielākoties Irāka&Afganistāna&Čečenija.

Sprādzienus Maskavas metro saista ar Ziemeļkaukāza separātistiem
www.DELFI.lv
29. marts 2010 17:38
Teroristiskie grupējumi, kas darbojas Ziemeļkaukāza reģionā, varētu būt saistīti ar pirmdien notikušajiem sprādzieniem Maskavas metro stacijās, ar atsauci uz avotiem izmeklēšanā ziņo Krievijas mediji.


Krievijas Federālais Drošības dienests (FDD) iepriekš pavēstījis, ka abus uzbrukumus īstenojušas teroristes - pašnāvnieces. Izmeklētāji atraduši divu sieviešu ķermeņus, kuras, pēc dažādām pazīmēm, pārnēsājušas spridzekli.

FDD uzskata, ka ar uzbrukumiem varētu būt saistīti tieši Ziemeļkaukāza kaujinieki.

Kā vēstīts, divi sprādzieni Maskavas metro stacijās "Lubjanka" un "Kultūras parks" nogranda pirmdienas rītā ar aptuveni pusstundas atstarpi.

Tiek uzskatīts, ka sprādziens "Lubjankā" sarīkots tādēļ, ka tur atrodas FDD ēka. Otrajam sprādzienam, iespējams, bija jānotiek nevis "Kultūras parkā", bet gan "Oktobra" stacijā, kur atrodas Krievijas Iekšlietu ministrijas centrālais aparāts.

Kā ziņots, ar stacijās izvietoto videonovērošanas kameru ierakstu palīdzību noskaidrotas arī uzbrucēju iespējamo līdzdalībnieču - slāvu izskata sieviešu - pazīmes, kuras teroristes pavadījušas pie ieejas "Dienvidrietumu" metro stacijā. Maskavā izsludināta viņu meklēšana.

Vēlāk arī kļuvis zināms, ka miličiem izdalīts fotorobots ar cita iespējamā uzbrucēju līdzgaitnieka attēlu. Tiek meklēts kāds vīrietis, kuram mugurā bija zili balta jaka, melna cepure un balti sporta apavi. Aizdomās turamajam esot neliela bārda.

Krievijas masu mediji pirmdien arī vēstīja, ka stacijā "Kultūras parks" tika atrasta josta ar neeksplodējušām sprāgstvielām, kas bija mugurā vienai no teroristēm - pašnāvniecēm. Taču tiesībsargājošās iestādes šo informāciju vēlāk noliedza.

Krievijas Nacionālajā pretterorisma komiteja strādā pastiprinātā režīmā. Drošības dienestiem pavēlēts īpašu uzmanību pievērst cilvēku pulcēšanās vietām.

Tikmēr Interpols piedāvājis Krievijas varas iestādēm palīdzību sprādzienu izmeklēšanā. Organizācijas mājas lapā izplatītajā paziņojumā norādīts, ka Interpols gatavs sniegt visu nepieciešamo palīdzību un nodrošināt Krievijas specdienestiem jebkurus resursus notikušā apstākļu noskaidrošanai.

Kā ziņots, sprādzienos gājuši bojā 38 cilvēki, vēl vairāk nekā 60 guvuši ievainojumus.

http://www.womansoul.ru/metric/19_1e_c_14092008_3.gif

299

Re: KrustnešuWač! Lielākoties Irāka&Afganistāna&Čečenija.

Checkered record of the world's policeman
www.atimes.com
By Jeremy Kuzmarov

"In the police you see the dirty work of Empire at close quarters. The wretched prisoners huddling in stinking cages of the lock-ups, the grey cowed faces of the long-term convicts, the scarred buttocks of the men who had been flogged with bamboos."
- George Orwell, Shooting An Elephant and Other Essays.

"The police interrogation rooms smelled of urine and injustice."
- Graham Greene, The Quiet American.

As the United States expands the war in Afghanistan and Pakistan, the Barack Obama administration has placed a premium on police training programs. The stated aim is to provide


security to the population so as to enable local forces to gradually take over from the military in completing the pacification process.

A similar strategy has been pursued in Iraq. American-backed forces have been implicated in sectarian violence, death squad activity and torture. At the same time, the weaponry and equipment that the US provided has frequently found its way into the hands of insurgents, many of whom have infiltrated the state security apparatus, contributing to the long-drawn out nature of both conflicts.

Ignored in mainstream media commentary and "think tank" analyses is the fact that the destructive consequences of American strategy in the Middle East and Central Asia today are consistent with practices honed over more than a century in the poor nations of the periphery.

Police training has been central to American attempts to expand its reach from the conquest of the Philippines at the dawn of the 20th century through the Cold War-era to today. Presented to the public in both the target country and the United States as humanitarian initiatives designed to strengthen democratic development and public security, these programs achieved neither, but were critical to securing the power base of local elites amenable to US economic and political interests and contributed to massive human-rights violations. They helped to facilitate the rise of powerful anti-democratic forces, which operated above the law, contributing to endemic violence, state terrorism and corruption.

Quite consistently across time and space, American policy-makers have supported police suppression of radical and nationalist movements as a cost-effective and covert means precluding costly military intervention which was more likely to arouse public opposition.

During the mid 1960s, the Director of United States Agency of International Development (USAID) David Bell commented in congressional testimony that "the police are a most sensitive point of contact between the government and people, close to the focal points of unrest, and more acceptable than the army as keepers of order over long periods of time. The police are frequently better trained and equipped than the military to deal with minor forms of violence, conspiracy and subversion."

Robert W Komer who served as a National Security Council advisor to President John F Kennedy further stressed that the police were "more valuable than Special Forces in our global counter-insurgency efforts" and particularly useful in fighting urban insurrections.

"We get more from the police in terms of preventative medicine than from any single US program," he said. "They are cost effective, while not going for fancy military hardware. They provide the first line of defense against demonstrations, riots and local insurrections. Only when the situation gets out of hand (as in South Vietnam) does the military have to be called in."

These remarks illuminate the underlying geo-strategic imperatives shaping the growth of the programs and the mobilization of police for political and military ends, which accounted for widespread human rights abuses.

This article, drawing on declassified US government archives, examines some of the landmark instances in the historical development of American police training programs to highlight the origins of current policies in the killing fields of Afghanistan and Iraq.

Over the years, as US imperial attention has shifted from one region to another, police training and financing has remained an unobserved constant, evolving with new strategies and weapons innovations but always retaining the same strategic goals and tactical elements. Staffed by military and police officers who valued order and discipline over the protection of civil liberties, the programs were designed to empower pro-US regimes committed to free-market capitalist development and helped to create elaborate intelligence networks, which facilitated the suppression of dissident groups in a more surgical way.

The US in effect helped to modernize intelligence gathering and political policing operations in its far-flung empire, thus magnifying their impact. These further helped to militarize the police and fostered, through rigorous ideological conditioning, the dehumanization of political adversaries. The result was a reign of torture and terror as part of police practice in countries subject to US influence, the devolution of police forces into brutal oppressors of the indigenous population, and the growth of corruption levels pushing regimes towards kleptocracy.

In his trilogy on the American empire, Chalmers Johnson demonstrates how the US has historically projected its global power through a variety of means, including economic blackmail and the manipulation of financial institutions, covert operations, arms sales, and most importantly, through the development of a global network of military bases whose scale dwarfs all previous empires, including Rome. This article seeks to add another important structural dimension of US power, namely the training of police and paramilitary units under the guise of humanitarian assistance, which preceded and continued through the era of global military bases.

Colonial policing and state terror in the Philippines
In 1898, seeking access to the vast "China market" and building the foundation of its seizure of Hawaii, the US entered the great "imperial game" through its colonization of the Philippines. From 1899-1902, the military waged a relentless campaign to suppress the nationalist movement for independence, resulting in the death of perhaps two million Filipinos and the destruction of the societal fabric.

As the fighting waned, the Philippines Commission under future president William H. Taft focused on building an indigenous police force, officered by Americans, which was capable of finishing off the insurgents and establishing order. The constabulary engaged in patrols for over a decade to suppress nationalist and messianic peasant revolts in the countryside. It frequently employed scorched earth tactics and presided over numerous massacres, including killing hundreds of civilians at Bud Dajo in the Moro province of Mindanao, where Muslims refused to acquiesce to American power and rule.

As Alfred W McCoy documents in his outstanding new book, Policing America's Empire: The United States, the Philippines and the Rise of the Surveillance State, the constabulary's success in serving US imperial interests owed largely to the role of military intelligence officers in imparting pioneering methods of data management and covert techniques of surveillance, which were appropriated by domestic policing agencies, including the Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI), during the 1st Red Scare.

Under the command of Harry H Bandholtz, the constabulary's secret service became especially effective in adopting psychological warfare techniques, such as the wearing of disguises, fabricating disinformation and recruiting paid informants and saboteurs in their efforts to "break up bands of political plotters". They monitored the press, carried out periodic assassinations and compiled dossiers on thousands of individuals as well as information on the corruption of America's Filipino proxies as means to keep them tied to the occupation.

One of the major technical achievements was an alarm system, which ended dependence on the public telephone. American advisors further imparted new administrative and fingerprinting techniques, which allowed for an expansion of the police's social control capabilities. The declaration of martial law ensured minimal governmental oversight and facilitated surveillance and arrests without due process. Torture, including the notorious water cure, was widely employed.

After the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus in Cavite and Batangas due to heavy guerrilla activity, William Cameron Forbes, a grandson of philosopher Ralph Waldo Emerson who served as commissioner of commerce and police from 1904 to 1908 and governor general from 1909-1913, noted in his journal that "the constabulary was now free to run in the suspects. A lot of innocent people will be put in jail for a while, but it will also mean that some guilty ones will be caught and the cancer will be cut". These comments exemplify the ends justifies the means philosophy underpinning the abuse of human rights, which was characteristic of later interventions as well.

Racism was another prominent factor. Henry T Allen, the first chief of the constabulary, characteristically referred to Filipinos resisting the US as suffering from "intense ignorance" and the "fanatical" characteristics of "semi-savagery". He added, in a letter to Taft, that "education and roads will effect what is desired, but while awaiting these, drastic measures are obligatory ... The only remedy is killing and for the same reason that a rabid dog must be disposed of."

In his memoir, Bullets and Bolos, constabulary officer John R White, who went on to serve with the US military in World War I, recounts how his men razed houses, "plundered all that they could carry away" and destroyed sugar and other foodstuffs in the attempt to isolate and starve the Moro enemy in Mindanao. In the end, they left the pretty plateau a "burned and scarred sore". This was hard, he wrote, "but necessary for we did not want the job of taking Mindanao again". The tactics pioneered in the Philippines paved the way for later American action under the Strategic Hamlet program in South Vietnam.

The constabulary ultimately succeeded in infiltrating and sowing dissension within radical organizations, including an incipient labor movement, contributing to their implosion. It even played a role in apostolic succession by undermining the influence of Bishop Gregorio Aglipay through the spread of disinformation. Aglipay was a nationalist with socialist sympathies whose services were attended by thousands of the urban poor.

The legacy of political repression and corruption survived long after the Philippines was granted independence in the mid 1930s. The constabulary and police have maintained their notoriety for brutality, right up to the present, as new waves of repression and violence are being launched under the guise of the "war on terror."

'Popping off Cacos': The US Gendarmerie and racial slaughter in Haiti
American policies in the Philippines were replicated in the Caribbean during the colonial occupations of the 1910s and 1920s, where they contributed to the spread of considerable violence and repression. In Haiti, the US Gendarmerie was the brainchild of Franklin D Roosevelt, who, influenced by his cousin, Teddy, viewed the creation of a local police force as a cost-effective means of advancing US reach. The gendarmerie was mobilized primarily to fight against nationalist rebels, known as the Cacos, and to oversee brutal forced labor regiments imposed by the United States.

As in the Philippines, the United States provided modern police technologies, including communications equipment and fingerprinting techniques, and worked to improve administration and records collection to aid in the monitoring of dissident activity. In a prelude to the Cold War, riot control training was also provided to facilitate the crack down on urban demonstrations and strikes. American officers taunted people using racial epithets and did not usually object when rioters were badly beaten and clubbed, sometimes to death.

Journalist Samuel G Inman observed that the gendarmerie enjoyed practically "unlimited power" in the districts where they served, creating opportunities for extortion and kickbacks. "He is the judge of practically all civil and criminal cases, the paymaster for all funds from the central government and ex-officio director of the schools inasmuch as he pays the teachers. He controls the mayor and city council since they cannot spend funds without his OK. As collector of taxes, he exercises a strong influence on all individuals in the community." These comments exemplify the consequences of US policy in giving too much power to police units, resulting in systematic abuse.

The gendarmerie was especially valued for obtaining intelligence and adopted, as a precursor to the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), psychological warfare (psy-war) tactics, including the spread of disinformation, the playing on native superstitions, and use of disguises to induce defections and infiltrate enemy camps.

One of the gendarmerie's chief psy-war experts, Captain Herman H Hanneken blackened his skin, disguised himself as a Caco and bribed a bodyguard to gain access to the camp of leader Charlemagne Peralte, who became known as the "black Christ" after images of his decapitated body strung up on a cross were disseminated for intimidation purposes. Political terrorism would remain a feature of American counter-insurgency strategy through the Vietnam War-era and continuing today in Afghanistan and Iraq.

The violence that was endemic to the American occupation of Haiti was in large part racial. On search and destroy missions, "popping off" Cacos was likened to a sport, much like with the "pulajanes," "ladrones" and "gu-gus" in the Philippines, and later the "gooks" in Vietnam.

Colonel Robert Denig noted in his diary that "life to Haitians is cheap, murder is nothing". Lieutenant Faustin Wirkus added that killing Haitian rebels was like playing "hit the nigger and get a cigar games" at amusement parks back home. After the Caco movement was destroyed and the Marines were withdrawn, the US continued to arm and train the gendarmerie which it recognized as a pivotal instrument of power.

Following a period of military rule in the 1940s, Francois "Papa Doc" Duvalier used the police to suppress political dissent, orchestrating what internal reports referred to as "an active campaign of harassment and terrorism all over the country". This fits in with a broader regional pattern, as the US-created National Guard evolved into the political instrument of dictators Anastasio Somoza in Nicaragua and Rafael Trujillo in the Dominican Republic, both having emerged from police ranks.

The police programs thus contributed not only to the spread of political violence in suppressing anti-occupational resistance, but also paved the way for an era of strong-armed rule and state terrorism after American colonial occupations formally ended.

Police training and political terror in South Vietnam
Building off the techniques pioneered in previous interventions, police training programs were an integral part of American counter-insurgency strategy in Vietnam, where they aided in the creation of an Orwellian-style police state and helped to stoke civil conflict.

Training began in 1955 as a centerpiece of America's "nation-building" campaign on behalf of president Ngo Dinh Diem, who replaced French puppet emperor Bao Dai following the temporary division of the country under the 1954 Geneva Accords. Valued by the US for his anti-communism, Diem had little interest in developing a Western-style democracy and wanted to establish his own political dynasty. The principal US motive was to contain the spread of the Chinese revolutionary movement, which threatened the Open Door policy. The Dwight D Eisenhower administration refused to allow mandated elections to unify the country, which it knew would be won by the revolutionary leader Ho Chi Minh, whom the State Department referred to as the "ablest" and "most charismatic leader" in the country.

The police operation was run by Michigan State University (MSU) faculty under contract with the State Department. Much like in the Philippines and Haiti decades earlier, the United States stressed mass surveillance capable of monitoring subversion and dismantling the political opposition to Diem.

New technologies hastened the scale of violence associated with these efforts, though proved limited in engendering a favorable outcome for the United States. American advisors urged police to develop a more efficient record gathering system and modeled the Surete (civil police force) after the American FBI, arming it with 12-gauge shotguns, sedans, ammunition, and riot-control equipment to counter subversion. There were few pretenses from the beginning that the police were anything but a political instrument, with many top officials, including Surete Director Nguyen Ngoc Le, having been previously trained by France.

The MSU team developed an identity card system to monitor political activity as part of Diem's anti-communist denunciation campaign. Those found with links to the Vietminh, who had led the liberation struggle against France, were arrested and faced torture at an assortment of prison camps, or were "disappeared," as internal reports noted. Even Diem's own chief of staff, Tran Van Don, derided the use of "Gestapo-like police raids and torture" against "those who simply opposed the government".

US support was crucial in shaping South Vietnam's evolution into what Foreign Affairs described as a "quasi-police state marred by arbitrary arrests, censorship of the press and the absence of political opposition". The passage of law 10/59 allowing for the execution of regime opponents resulted in the declaration of armed resistance by the National Liberation Front (NLF), whose leader, Nguyen Huu Tho was rescued from house arrest through infiltration of Diem's police by revolutionary supporters.

Starting in 1961, after taking over from Michigan State, the United States Agency for International Development's Office of Public Safety (OPS) sent advisers to Malaya for counter-guerrilla training. Over the next fourteen years, working with the Public Safety Division of the US Operations Mission to Vietnam (USOM), the OPS provided more than 300 advisers and $300 million towards this goal, bolstering the number of police from 16,000 to 122,000.

They funded eight specialized training schools and built over 500 rural police stations and high-tech urban headquarters equipped with firearm ranges, computer systems and padded interrogation rooms. The OPS also helped to create a telecommunications network linking police headquarters in rural villages to major cities such as Saigon.

As in the Philippines and Haiti, emphasis was placed on building a corps of informants and developing a climate of fear to intimidate those who might challenge the government. To this latter end, psychological warfare teams painted a ghostly eye on the doors of houses suspected of harboring "Vietcong" agents. Penetration by the NLF, however, and a lack of conviction on the part of American trained forces helped to stymie these efforts, to the frustration of many American advisors who could not get around the strength of Vietnamese nationalism and political dynamic underlying the civil war. Language and cultural barriers and an underlying paternalism further strained social relations and made communications difficult, limiting effectiveness.

In May 1963, as opposition to Diem's rule intensified, police killed nine monks, as well as three women and two children at a rally against religious persecution and government violence. In July, according to OPS adviser Ray Lundgren, in spite of the "amazing results" yielded by riot control courses, police again displayed "unnecessary brutality" in suppressing a peaceful Buddhist rally against repeated injustices, beating monks and other civilians.

In November, Diem was overthrown in a coup d'etat and replaced by a revolving door of generals, including ultimately Nguyen Cao Ky and Nguyen Van Thieu, who had served under the French and were implicated in the narcotics trade. The US in turn invaded and launched massive bombing campaigns which decimated the South Vietnamese countryside.

In an attempt to maximize social control in the face of mounting popular resistance, the OPS expanded the surveillance program first initiated by Michigan State, issuing identity cards to everyone over 15 and compiling dossiers on the political beliefs of nearly 12 million people. Once dissidents were identified, the police undertook night sweeps in their villages and "arrested anyone under the remotest suspicion of being left-wing", as one witness put it. "The government has a blacklist of suspects, but I understand that wives, mothers and fathers - anyone with the slimmest association with those on it are being caught in the net."

Many of those taken in were peace activists, students, members of oppositional groups like the Hoa-Hao and Cao Dai sects, and politicians who were seen as threats to the reigning junta. Echoing his predecessors in previous interventions, CIA Station Chief Douglas Blaufarb rationalized the repression on the grounds that "it was futile to have expected in the circumstances a punctilious regard in all cases for the niceties of civil rights". Racism and the perceived inferiority of the Vietnamese "gooks" lay behind wide-scale human-rights violations.

Some of the worst abuses took place within the prison system overseen by the OPS. Conditions were described as "nightmarish", "appalling" and equivalent to "hell on earth", stemming largely from the rampant overcrowding caused by the influx of political prisoners.

Inmates were packed into tiny cells, where they had to sleep standing up or in shifts, and deprived of proper food, bathing facilities and medical attention. At Kien Tung Provincial Prison, just 10 kilometers from the seat of government, William C Benson of the OPS reported that the cells were "extremely dirty and the stench so nauseating" that it made him sick.

In An Xuyen, OPS advisor Donald Bordenkircher, who three decades later was appointed to head the Abu Ghraib prison facility in Iraq, wrote to his superiors that inmates had to sleep next to their own urine and feces and that the kitchen doubled as a trash dump and was inhabited by giant rats which were "as large as cats".

Known as a stern disciplinarian, Bordenkircher embodies the continuity in American policies from Vietnam to Iraq, Afghanistan and the United States itself, where as town sheriff in Moundsville Virginia in 1986, he played a key role in crushing an inmate rebellion arising from wretched prison conditions.

Torture including sensory deprivation, rape, lashings and the use of electroshocks was widely documented in facilities under US oversight in Vietnam.

Frank Walton, head of the OPS in Vietnam and a former Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) chief, sanctioned a report stating that non-cooperative prisoners, whom he referred to as "reds who keep preaching the commie line", were "isolated in their cells for months" and permanently "bolted to the floor or handcuffed to leg-irons", which was standard practice shaped by the war climate.

Not surprisingly, the prisons provided an important base of recruitment for the revolutionary forces, contributing to their


ultimate victory in 1975. After a tour of penal facilities in the Mekong Delta, senior American adviser John Paul Vann commented, "I got the distinct impression that any detainees not previously VC [Viet Cong] or VC sympathizers would almost assuredly become so after their period of incarceration."

Police programs in Vietnam culminated in the notorious "Operation Phoenix", whose aim was to eliminate the Viet Cong infrastructure (VCI) through use of sophisticated computer technology and intelligence gathering techniques, and improved coordination between military and civilian police intelligence agencies. In practice, Phoenix spiraled out of control and led to indiscriminate violence.

Internal reports pointed out the widespread corruption of American-trained cadres who used their positions for revenge and extortion, threatening to kill people who refused to pay them huge sums. "VC avenger units," regularly mutilated bodies and killed family members of suspected guerrillas. While the quantity of "neutralizations" was reported to be very high in many districts, there were "flagrant" cases of report padding, most egregiously in the province of Long An where Phoenix advisor Evan Parker Jr noted that "the numbers just don't add up". Dead bodies were being identified as VCI, rightly or wrongly, in order to fulfill quotas.

The catalogue of agents listed as killed included an inordinate number of "nurses", which was a convenient way to account for women killed in raids on suspected VC hideouts. A Phoenix operative who had served in Czechoslovakia during World War II tellingly commented, "The reports that I would send in on the number of communists that were neutralized reminded me of the reports Hitler's concentration camp commanders sent in on how many inmates they had exterminated, each commander lying that he had killed more than the other to please Himmler."

These comments epitomize how the police training programs helped to facilitate state repression and terror under the rubric of internal security and modernization. The attempt at social control through imposition of an Orwellian regime of mass surveillance and torture lay at the root of the wide-scale humanitarian abuses, which fit with a much larger historical pattern.

The violence comes full circle in AfPak and Iraq
The violent history of US imperial intervention is being played out today in Afghanistan and Iraq, where police training programs are central to American-backed political repression and terror. Management of the programs has been especially poor given cultural and language barriers, deeply entrenched hostility towards foreign intervention among the population, and administrative incompetence.

In addition, the problems have been exacerbated by the increasing reliance on private mercenary corporations such as DynCorp and Blackwater (re-named Xe), and on tainted police advisors linked to human-rights violations and malfeasance.

In Afghanistan, after almost nine years and $7 billion spent on training and salaries, an internal report concluded that "nepotism, financial improprieties and unethical recruitment practices were commonplace" among the American-backed forces, which engaged in widespread criminal activity and bribery and were "overmatched in counter-insurgency and counter-narcotics operations".

American police advisors, whose background as small town cops did little to prepare them for policing in a war zone, made six figure salaries, 50 times more than their Afghan counterparts, who resented their presence. According to a recent poll, less than 20% of the population in the eastern and southern provinces trusted the police, who are poorly motivated and whose poor performance has contributed to political instability and the resurgence of the Taliban.

A taxi driver interviewed by RAND Corporation analyst Seth G Jones tellingly commented, "Forget about the Taliban, it is the police we worry about."

Despised and feared, the Afghan national police have been continuously controlled by ethnic warlords paid off by the CIA and are central to what Ambassador Ron Neumann characterized as the pattern of "repression and oppression" gripping the country.

They have routinely engaged in shakedowns at impromptu checkpoints, shot at and killed stone-throwing or unarmed demonstrators, stolen farmers' land, and terrorized the civilian population while undertaking house-to-house raids in military-assisted sweep operations. They have further intimidated voters during fraudulent elections, including the one that brought President Hamid Karzai back to power in 2009. According to village elders in Babaji, police bent on taking revenge against clan rivals carried out the abduction and rape of pre-teen girls and boys.

These kinds of abuses fit with a larger historical pattern, and are a product of the ethnic antagonisms and social polarizations bred by the US intervention, and the mobilization of police for military and political ends.

The open support by the George W Bush administration for torture and other harsh methods strengthened the proclivity towards indiscriminate violence.

The International Red Cross reported massive overcrowding in Afghan prisons, "harsh" conditions, a lack of clarity about the legal basis for detention, and people being held "incommunicado" in isolation cells where they were "subjected to cruel treatment in violation of the Geneva Conventions". An undisclosed number have died in custody, including several thousand who were transported under the oversight of CIA-backed warlord Rashid Dostum in unventilated containers, where they suffocated to death or were shot.

Corruption has been a major problem as police routinely accept kickbacks from black-market activities. Fitting a historical pattern, the State Department and CIA have maintained close ties with top officials who are directly involved in the narcotics trade, causing production to rise to over 8,000 tons per annum. The president's own brother, Ahmed Wali, a CIA "asset" who heads a paramilitary group used for raids on suspected Taliban enclaves has used allegedly used drug proceeds to fund state terror operations, including the intimidation of opponents in the election of 2009.

Karzai's 2007 appointment as anti-corruption chief, Izzatullah Wasifi, meanwhile, spent almost four years in a Nevada prison for trying to sell heroin to an undercover police officer. A CIA officer commented that during the US-NATO occupation, "Virtually every significant Afghan figure has had brushes with the drug trade. If you are looking for Mother Theresa, she doesn't live in Afghanistan."

Cheryl Bernard, a RAND analyst and wife of Zalmay Khalilzad, UN Ambassador of the Bush administration, explained one of the key reasons for the lack of good governance: "To defeat the Soviets we threw the worst crazies against them. Then we allowed them to get rid of, just kill all the moderate leaders. The reason we don't have moderate leaders in Afghanistan today is because we let the nuts kill them all. They killed all the leftists, the moderates, the middle of the roaders. They were just eliminated, during the 1980s and afterwards."

The US continues to tolerate high-levels of corruption out of perceived geopolitical expediency, claiming that it is engrained within the political culture of Afghanistan and other "backward nations" in which it intervenes. In reality, however, it is a product of historical contingencies, the breakdown of social mores caused by the war-climate and the need of elite officials lacking popular legitimacy to obtain money for counter-insurgency operations.

Similar factors were at play in the 1960s when Vietnam and Laos were at the center of the world drug trade, benefiting from American backing of corrupt officials who controlled the traffic, with the CIA overseeing the production and sale of opium by Hmong guerrillas in order to finance the secret war against the Pathet Lao.

History is thus coming full circle in Afghanistan, which now produces 93% of the world's heroin and has been characterized by even Fox News, a major champion of American intervention, as a "narco-state".

Drug money has corrupted all facets of society, crippled the legal economy and made it nearly impossible to carry out the simplest development projects while most of the population lives in crushing poverty. As in South Vietnam under US occupation, the main airport has become a major trans-shipment point for heroin and positions for police chief in many provinces are auctioned off to the highest bidder due to their enormous graft value. Securing a job as chief of police on the border is rumored to cost upwards of $150,000.

In another parallel to Vietnam, rampant human-rights violations have driven many people into the arms of the insurgency. A 2009 report by Commanding General Stanley A McChrystal describes Afghan prisons as a particularly important recruiting base and "sanctuary [for Islamic militants] to conduct lethal operations" against government and coalition forces, including the 2008 bombing of the Serena hotel in Kabul which was allegedly planned without interference from prison personnel.

McChrystal, a former Special Forces assassin, notes that "there are more insurgents per square foot in corrections facilities than anywhere else in Afghanistan". These comments suggest that the recent Obama "surge" represents a costly and futile escalation of a conflict in which the US has no prospects of victory.

Beginning in 2004, as war increasingly spilled over into Pakistan, the State Department provided tens of millions of dollars in technical aid, training and equipment to the Pakistani police. The central aim was to fight the Taliban and consolidate the power of military dictator Pervez Musharraf and his successor Ali Asaf Zhardari.

American advisors introduced a computerized security and evaluation system to monitor all movement across the border, created special counter-narcotics units and a police air wing which was supplied with three caravan spotter planes and eight Huey helicopters to aid in counter-insurgency operations. Police play a vital role alongside mercenary firms such as Xe operations in identifying targets for CIA predator drone attacks which have killed hundreds of civilians, including over 100 during an errant strike on the village of Bola Baluk.

As in Afghanistan, militarization has enhanced the already repressive character of the police and contributed to the intensification of a vicious civil war in which over two million people have been rendered refugees. Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) meanwhile is deeply caught up in the heroin traffic, with the usual CIA collusion, and has been infiltrated by pro-Taliban elements, revealing the futility of American training programs and intervention.

In Iraq, much as in Vietnam three decades earlier, American training programs have contributed to the shattering of the societal fabric. The mission was initially headed by Bernard Kerik, former New York City police commissioner who won fame in leading rescue efforts at ground zero after the September 11, 2001 attacks and was later convicted and sentenced to four years in prison on charges of tax fraud and public corruption.

In spite of hundreds of millions in funding, the Iraqi National Police (INP) remains under-equipped and riddled with cronyism and corruption. Police were so poorly motivated and paid that many sold their bullets and uniforms on the black market.

Historically, the forces trained by the United States to subdue their own countrymen have taken on the air of paid mercenaries with little loyalty to their benefactor or the cause that they purportedly represent. Iraq is no exception to this general rule.

A State Department report noted that because of poor morale, Iraqi police have been rendered "ineffective and have quit or abandoned their stations". They were infiltrated by sectarian militias who used American weapons to engage in ethnic cleansing and brazenly drove through city streets in daylight hours with dead bodies in the backs of their trucks.

Militarized units routinely fired into crowds of unarmed demonstrators and had a history of going on forays into Sunni neighborhoods just to punish civilians. Several dozen investigative journalists and 200 prominent academics who opposed the US invasion were among those assassinated. Jerry Burke, one of the original police trainers who served two tours in Iraq, told reporters in 2007 that the INP was unsalvageable and that many of its members should be prosecuted for criminal human-rights violations, war crimes and death squad activities.

A central US focus was on training heavily armed commando units, recruited from Saddam Hussein's Special Forces after the reversal of the de-Ba'athification policy, whose primary mission was to "neutralize" high level insurgents.

American strategy in this respect was modeled after the Phoenix program in Vietnam, of which Vice President Dick Cheney was particularly enamored, and also bore heavy resemblances to practices in Central America during Ronald Reagan's terrorist wars of the 1980s. In 2004, Cheney openly called for the "Salvador option," referring to the US role in training paramilitary units to assassinate left-wing guerrilla leaders and their supporters during El Salvador's dirty war, largely with the aim of intimidating the population into submission.

James Steele's appointment as a top adviser to Iraq's most fearsome counterinsurgency force, the 5,000 man Special Police Commandos, exemplified the continuity in US policy. Steele served with the Green Berets in Vietnam, further honed his tactics training Contra forces in Nicaragua in the 1980s, then led a special forces mission in El Salvador where his men were implicated in serious human-rights abuses, including "disappearances," torture and the massacre of civilians.

Journalist Dahr Jamail wrote that it was no coincidence daily life in Iraq came to resemble "what the death squads generated in Central America ... Hundreds of unclaimed dead at the morgue - blood-caked men who had been shot, knifed, garroted or apparently suffocated by the plastic bag still over their heads. Many of their bodies were sprawled with their hands still bound".

By training and arming Iraqi police officials notorious for corruption, beatings, kidnappings and mass executions, American advisors contributed to the bloodbath in Iraq. The continuity in personnel and practice from past interventions shows the violent consequences of US training programs.

American advisors favored hard-line commanders, like Adnan Thabit, whom close aides compared to the "godfather" and who threatened to kill the one journalist brave enough to interview him. On October 5, 2006, US military forces removed the entire 8th brigade of the 2nd National Police Division from duty and arrested its officers after the brigade was implicated in the raid of a food factory in Baghdad and the kidnapping of 26 Sunni workers, seven of whom were executed. The Los Angeles Times reported that at the Baghdad morgue, "dozens of bodies arrive at the same time on a weekly basis, including scores of corpses with wrists bound by police handcuffs".

In December 2006, the Iraq study group portrayed a grave and deteriorating state of affairs, noting that "the Shi'ite dominated police units cannot control crime and they routinely engage in sectarian violence, including the unnecessary detention, torture and targeted execution of Sunni Arab civilians. Many police participated in training in order to obtain a weapon, uniform and ammunition for use in sectarian violence."

A Human Rights Watch report around the same time detailed police methods of interrogation in which prisoners were "routinely" beaten with cables and pipes, shocked, or suspended from their wrists for prolonged periods of time - tactics associated with Hussein's dictatorship. Iraqis frequently complained of police breaking into homes, extorting money for ransom and arbitrarily conducting arrests. One interviewee commented, "This isn't a police force, it's a bunch of thugs." What all these reports ignore is the systematic US responsibility for the training and methods that produced such outcomes.

As a symbol of foreign oppression, the INP became the frequent target of insurgent attacks. Nearly 3,000 police were killed and over 5,000 injured between September 2005 and April 2006 alone. In a reflection of the violent climate bred by the occupation, a number of high-ranking police officers, including the head of the serious crimes unit in Baghdad, were shot dead by US soldiers who thought that they were suicide bombers. Iraqi police have condemned the Americans as cowardly for not taking the same risks to their lives as they were ordered to take, and for being better protected from attack.

A police lieutenant in Baghdad commented that "the [Americans] hide behind the barricades while we are here in the streets without even guns to protect ourselves".

As in the Philippines, Haiti and Vietnam earlier, American advisors held racial stereotypes of Iraqis and a paternalistic and colonial mindset that bred resentment. In a memoir of his year in Iraq, Robert Cole, a police officer from East Palo Alto, California and a DynCorp employee, explains that these attitudes were engrained in a mini-boot camp training session, where he was "brainwashed, reprogrammed and desensitized" and "morphed" into a "trained professional killer".

Cole reports being told to shoot first and think later and to instruct police to do the same. "If you see a suspicious Iraqi civilian, pull your weapon and gun him down," he was told, "you don't fire one or two shots ... You riddle his sorry ass with bullets until you're sure he's dead as a doorknob."

This is an inversion not only of democratic police methods but even of Western counterinsurgency doctrine which, at least in theory, advocates a moderation of force in order to avoid antagonizing the population and creating martyrs for the revolutionary cause. It is no wonder that the scope of violence and human-rights abuses in Iraq has been so high. In spite of all the bloodshed and negative reports, however, the Iraq Study group actually recommended expanding American police training in the misconceived belief that more resources and aid could help professionalize the force (as Obama is now doing in Afghanistan).

This was a crucial dimension of the much vaunted "surge". Efforts were initiated to include Sunnis in the police and purge corrupt members who engaged in sectarian violence, including the head of the Ministry of the Interior, Bayan Jabr, a Shi'ite extremist who oversaw a torture chamber beneath his offices in which survivors were found with drill marks in their skulls. Nonetheless, extrajudicial violence and killings have remained endemic. On March 16, 2009, the New York Times reported, for example, that police officers abducted and killed six prisoners released from Camp Bucca in revenge for their days as insurgents. These actions appear to be routine.

Since the "surge," police have been delegated more responsibility in manning checkpoints and aiding in combat operations, thus increasing opportunities for extortion and abuse. To what end? Robert M. Witajewski, a top civilian police trainer and director of the embassy's Law Enforcement and Correctional Affairs program expressed concern that in "over-militarizing the police", the US was potentially "creating an entity that could cause a coup down the road".

There are plenty of historical examples which bear out these fears. Few in Washington appear, however, to acknowledge them.

In response to the wave of neo-conservative analysts extolling the virtues of empire in the aftermath of 9/11, Chalmers Johnson writes in Nemesis: The Last Days of the American Republic that the idea of "forcing thousands of people to be free by slaughtering them - with Maxim machine guns in the 19th century, or 'precision munitions' today - seems to reflect a deeply felt need as well as a striking inability to imagine the lives and viewpoints of others". He added that "all empires require myths of divine right, racial pre-eminence, manifest destiny or a 'civilizing mission' to cover their often barbarous behavior in other people's country".

American imperial intervention throughout the long century from the conquest of the Philippines through the ongoing wars in Afghanistan and Iraq has indeed sown much human misery and violence.

While it has helped to vanquish some genuinely totalitarian forces, such as the Nazis and imperial Japanese, all too often those at the wrong end of the guns have been supporters of nationalist and social revolutionary movements seeking badly needed social change. Many were driven underground through repression and as a result of the US refusal to implement internationally sanctioned diplomatic settlements, such as the Geneva Accords of 1954 in Vietnam. Like previous colonial powers, the US has also often helped to exacerbate ethnic divisions and conflict, as in Afghanistan and Iraq today, with disastrous results.

US police training programs exemplify the dark side of the American empire. They have been crucial in advancing American power and in perpetuating and even creating the particular types of repressive regimes that emerged under US guidance - namely regimes which were dependent on foreign aid for their survival and developed repressive surveillance and internal security apparatuses to quash dissent.

While American strategic planners hoped that the police programs could provide the social stability for liberal-capitalist development to take root, the programs often spiraled out of control and empowered rogue forces, which used the modern weaponry and resources to advance their own power and to suppress personal rivals.

American police training furthermore spawned endless cycles of violence and in turn contributed to the delegitimizing of American client regimes and the empowerment of resistance movements because of the abuses that they inflicted. Police programs epitomize the limits of American social engineering efforts and power and unintended consequences of US covert manipulation.

Many of the worst features of American police training programs have been evident in the contemporary occupations of Afghanistan and Iraq, which sought to incorporate methods that were honed in previous interventions. That these methods bred horrific consequences was of little importance to policy-makers for whom the ends seemingly justify the means.

While differing political contexts have ensured different results historically, there are some patterns that emerge as universal, namely the role of the United States in imparting sophisticated policing equipment and trying to professionalize the internal security apparatus of client regimes as a means of fortifying their power and repressing the political opposition.

New technologies have been developed to try and hasten the efficiency of this latter task, though the overriding goal has remained the same, from the Philippines occupation forward.

American society is at a crossroads: it can continue to pursue the destructive path of empire, leading to endless cycles of violence and warfare as well as environmental degradation and economic hardship and political repression at home, or it can adopt a more humble, non-violent approach to foreign policy and thus serve as a beacon for world peace while redirecting the country's resources towards constructive ends.

There is still time to embrace the non-violent option, although the Obama administration is moving in the wrong direction, and time is getting short if our civilization is to survive with its moral integrity intact.

Dievs zina labāk. Tekstā viss labais no Islāma, bet trūkumi un sliktais no manis. Ja mans dažkārt skarbais tonis kādu aizvaino, tad ziniet, ka tas nav mans nolūks. Mans nolūks un novēlējums ir lai cilvēki patiesi apdomātu savas attiecības ar Dievu un cenšanās piedāvāt Islāmu tāds kāds tas ir. Ja es sev paglaimoju, tad saku, ka man ir nesabalansētas zināšanas. Arī Islāma zinātnieki dažkārt kļūdās un maldina savos tekstos citus, tad jau ahmeds kādu reizi savās amatieriskajās zināšanās noteikti. Šī foruma darbība un mani komentāri nav attiecināmi uz Latvijas muslimu kopienu vai organizācijām. Es stāstu par Islāmu tā kā to saprotu šodien, jau 7 gadus apgūstot Islāmu, un manām zināšanām augot, nākotnē varētu zināt un skaidrot precīzāk, nekļūdīgāk, ar mazāk pārpratumiem un labākā izteiksmes veidā. Es gaidu padomus, bet kritiku uztveru neveselīgi.

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Re: KrustnešuWač! Lielākoties Irāka&Afganistāna&Čečenija.

Vācu karavīri kļūdās un nogalina sešus afgāņu kolēģus
http://www.delfi.lv/news/world/accident … d=31025383

Starptautiskās misijas Afganistānā (ISAF) Vācijas kontingenta pārstāvji kļūdas dēļ nogalinājuši sešus Afganistānas Nacionālās armijas karavīrus, ziņo ārvalstu masu mediji, atsaucoties uz Afganistānas Aizsardzības ministrijas oficiālo paziņojumu.

Incidents noticis piektdien vakarā, pulksten 18:30 pēc vietējā laika ziemeļu provincē Kunduzā, kur afgāņu karavīru grupas apgādes dienesta automašīnai uzbruka vācieši.

Afganistānas Aizsardzības ministrija nosoda šo incidentu un izsaka līdzjūtību bojāgājušo tuviniekiem.

Vācijas karavīri, visticamāk, atklājuši uguni, jo bijuši stresa stāvoklī. Neilgi pirms incidenta šajā rajonā vairāku stundu ilgušā kaujā ar "Taliban" kaujiniekiem gājuši bojā trīs Vācijas kontingenta karavīri, vēl pieci guvuši smagus ievainojumus. Vācijas karavīri Afganistānas kolēģus noturējuši par kaujiniekiem un sākuši šaut.